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Highlights (3-5 bullet points, 85 characters per bullet point): 
1. Uncovers how the scope of factors important for organism choice goes beyond 
mere ‘convenience’. 
 
2.   Identifies 20 criteria, clustered into 5 categories, for organism choice in biology. 
 
3.  The criteria offer a conceptual framework for reflecting on what makes an 
organism useful or “good” for research. 
 
4.  Criteria for organism choice are not independent but interact in context-
dependent ways. 
 
5. Biologists often use a process of multidimensional refinement to shape decisions 
regarding organism use. 
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Abstract (up to 200 words):  
Despite August Krogh’s famous admonition that a ‘convenient’ organism exists for every 
biological problem, we argue that appeals to ‘convenience’ are not sufficient to capture 
reasoning about organism choice. Instead, we offer a detailed analysis based on 
empirical data and philosophical arguments for a working set of twenty criteria that 
interact with each other in the highly contextualized judgements that biologists make 
about organism choice. We propose to think of these decisions as a form of ‘differential 
analysis’ where researchers weigh multiple criteria for organismal choice against each 
other, and often utilize multidimensional refinement processes to finalize their choices. 
The specific details of any one case make it difficult to draw generalizations or to 
abstract away from specific research situations. However, this analysis of criteria for 
organismal choice and how these are related in practice allows us to reflect more 
generally on what makes a particular organism useful or ‘good.’ 
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1. Introduction 
In 2011, a group of biologists estimated that there are 8.7 million species 
currently living on Earth, give or take 1.3 million (Mora et al., 2011). But biologists do not 
study them all. In fact, many scientific commentators have been concerned that 
experimental biologists seem to focus their research on a very small fraction of extant 
species (Beery and Kaufer, 2015; Bolker, 2012). The decision to focus on a particular 
species (or handful of species) or even on a specific strain or variant is a common 
feature of biological research (Burian, 1993; Clarke and Fujimura, 1992; Hopwood, 
2011). In this paper, we investigate the factors that guide the choice of organisms for 
biological research, focusing particularly on the interrelation of such criteria.  
The most famous criterion for organism choice is usually attributed to the Nobel 
Prize winning physiologist, August Krogh (Green et al., 2018). Dubbed Krogh’s Principle 
by Hans Krebs in 1929, Krogh claimed that “[f]or such a large number of problems there 
will be some animal of choice, or a few such animals, on which it can be most 
conveniently studied” (Krogh, 1929; Krebs, 1975; Krebs and Krebs, 1980). The claim is 
popular amongst biologists, as can be seen through the over 160 citations to Krebs’ 
paper on the Krogh Principle over the last forty years. Thanks to the Krogh Principle, the 
term ‘convenience’ has frequently been invoked when describing how researchers 
make such decisions, but this single term is overly broad (Green et al., 2018).  
  ‘Convenience’ has frequently been understood as signposting practical and 
logistical choices in research design, which are made irrespectively of conceptual 
analysis and are meant to facilitate the day-to-day running of an investigation. In other 
words, the appeal to convenience has been interpreted by some researchers (and many 
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philosophers) to involve the removal of as many practical obstacles as possible from 
research activities, so that researchers can pursue their studies without disruption or 
delays due to recalcitrant materials or unwieldy laboratory conditions (Gest 1995, 
Robert 2008). Interpreted in this way, ‘convenience’ has limited epistemic significance, 
and remains tied to technical aspects of the set-up and planning of research that some 
would contend are not central to science.  
Appeals to convenience, we argue, are not sufficient to capture reasoning about 
organismal choice. As contemporary physiologists have noted: “The Krogh Principle, as 
it is now known, is often taken to be about more than ‘convenience’ when selecting the 
‘best’ organism for the study of a certain physiological problem” (Andrews and Enstipp, 
2016, p. 42). Here, the use of ‘best’ reflects more than simple logistical choices on the 
part of researchers. Reference to the terminology of convenience can also be 
interpreted as signposting significant strategic judgements around the design, 
realization, and interpretation of research on non-human organisms which have 
considerable implications for the type of knowledge obtained and the direction and 
organization of biological research as a whole. Our analysis of more specific criteria 
demonstrates that multiple criteria are at play within any one research project. Some of 
these criteria interact synergistically with each other, while others may be in tension or 
even direct conflict with one another. The extent to which researchers manage these 
types of tensions and strategize around the strengths and weaknesses of specific 
criteria contributes to the success of their employment of particular organisms in their 
research.  
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Our methods combine detailed analysis of scientific and historical literature on 
the Krogh principle enriched with insights from our own fieldwork and related historical 
and philosophical scholarship. We begin with an examination of more general 
scholarship in philosophy and biology on choice of research foci and components 
(section 2), drawing on the oft-time cited philosophical account by the population 
geneticist Richard Levins about “trade-offs” in model choice (1966) as a starting point 
for a broader reflection on the strategies and implications involved in the choices made 
when setting up a scientific project. We explore whether choices of research organisms 
are characterized by trade-offs similar to those Levins described in relation to model 
choice, such as generality, realism, and tractability. We contend that Levins' approach is 
insufficient for understanding the types of criteria associated with organismal choice, 
and that stark or generic trade-offs of the kind envisioned by him do not seem to exist in 
this domain.  
Following a brief discussion on methodology (section 3), we identify and discuss 
twenty criteria for organism choice (section 4). This analysis shows how the kinds of 
values, assumptions, and expectations that enter into judgements about ‘good’ 
organismal choice are considerably more complex than a seemingly simple appeal to 
convenience as a pragmatic criterion. In section 5, we discuss how these different 
criteria can be synergistic or in tension with each other, and how commitment to one 
criterion (or a cluster of criteria) is often correlated with deemphasizing or devaluing 
others. We also contend that the ways in which each criterion for organism choice 
relates to others depends strongly on the specific research situation, making it 
impossible to produce a compact, generalizable matrix of trade-offs similar to the one 
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envisioned by Levins. We propose to think of this as a form of ‘differential analysis’ 
where researchers weigh multiple criteria against each other, and often utilize 
multidimensional refinement processes to finalize their choices. We provide several 
examples which illustrate the diversity of situations in which choice criteria are 
evaluated and strategically prioritized. We conclude that although the specific details of 
any one case make it difficult to draw generalizations or to abstract away from specific 
research situations, this analysis of criteria associated with organismal choice and how 
they relate to each other in practice allows us to reflect more generally on what makes a 
particular organism useful or ‘good.’ These criteria also may prove useful in other 
scientific domains involving choices of research focus or material are critical to the 
scientific practices that result. 
2. Philosophical Perspectives on Choosing Research Components 
Judgements regarding theory choice (and what is considered to be a ‘good’ 
theory) appear to be useful analogs to judgements regarding organismal choice, so we 
begin this section with a selective review of the literature on theory and model choice for 
insights about the reasoning practices associated with assessing, evaluating, weighing, 
and comparing criteria for those choices. Numerous philosophers, historians, and social 
scientists have distilled different sets of defining values and norms for theory choice 
using various case studies. For instance, Thomas Kuhn (1977, p. 322) offers a list of 
five criteria for good theories (namely accuracy, consistency, broad scope, simplicity, 
and fruitfulness), and W. H. Newton-Smith (1981, pp. 226–30) provides a list of eight 
“good-making features of theories” (namely observational nesting, fertility, track record, 
inter-theory support, smoothness, internal consistency, compatibility with well-grounded 
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metaphysical beliefs, and simplicity), while Lindley Darden (1991) expands the list 
further still. These lists, of course, could be expanded to include pragmatic criteria 
common in the organism-choice related literature to be discussed in more detail below 
(e.g., Burian, 1993; Clarke and Fujimura, 1992), such as cost and tractability, and social 
criteria, which include opportunism or political support for particular forms of research. 
Some of these criteria, such as simplicity, are considered epistemic by some 
philosophers (Laudan, 1986) and social by some sociologists (e.g., Bloor, 1981), 
although others have attempted to break down those distinctions (e.g., Longino, 1990; 
Solomon, 2001). 
It is undoubtedly the case that evaluative judgments in scientific practice are 
typically multidimensional, be they in relation to the choice of research materials, or of 
theories or models. Scientific evaluation of a theory or a model can entail the mutual 
satisfaction of multiple criteria and/or trade-offs between different criteria. In his famous 
treatise on models in ecology, Richard Levins (1966; 1968) argues that one cannot 
have both generality and precision in any one model. He highlights how emphasis on a 
specific epistemic advantage of a chosen research entity (i.e., a particular model of 
population biology in his case) is unavoidably tied to simplifying assumptions and thus 
the devaluing of other features. Levins points to generality, realism, and tractability as 
traits of models that are necessarily in tension with each other, and which cannot be 
achieved in equal measure in any one choice. As he and many others building on his 
work have shown (Odenbaugh, 2002, 2006; Weisberg, 2006; Matthewson and 
Weisberg, 2009), increasing the generality of a chosen model by making it applicable to 
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a larger set of cases necessarily decreases its descriptive value (its realism) as a 
representation of one specific case. 
Even though they often are not as explicit as Levins, biologists have used a fairly 
consistent constellation of standards in their comparative evaluation of most theories, 
and philosophers of biology have done considerable work to enumerate those values 
and understand the ways in which they are used in scientific judgments (e.g., Lloyd, 
1988 on confirmation; Darden, 1991 on assessment during cycles of scientific change; 
more generally on values in scientific practice, see Longino, 1990; Lacey, 2004; 
Douglas, 2009). While there is a rich literature on the rise of certain organisms in 
biological research, philosophers, historians, and sociologists have taken a somewhat 
piecemeal approach to articulating the criteria that have been crucial to organismal 
choice in part because of their reliance on case studies of key organisms. In his 
reflections on the choice of experimental organisms, Richard Burian (1993) directs our 
attention to a number of features of this situation. Examples include how contingencies 
of evolution and circumstance make it difficult in many cases to know immediately 
whether a particular organism is a good choice for a particular investigation, and how 
the attributes of an organism can transform the researchers’ perspectives on the 
investigative task at hand and lead them to questions that are better suited to the 
organism’s features. Burian rightly emphasizes the multiple contingencies involved in 
finding and making an organism suitable for an investigative task. He notes that “the 
features that an organism should possess in order to be suitable for a given job are 
determined in good part by the problem at issue and by the available techniques” (p. 
361, n. 20).  
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While Burian acknowledges the importance of issues including standardization and 
cost, he points to work by Doris Zallen (1993) for more detailed criteria. Zallen’s careful 
analysis of the history of photosynthesis research leads her to articulate criteria such as 
the match between organismal properties and experimental equipment, the “ease of 
cultivation and maintenance of the organism,” the stability of the organism’s properties, 
the ease with which multiple methods can be applied to the same kind of organisms, 
and the ease with which results can be generalized to other organisms (pp. 278–279). 
In the same special issue of the Journal of the History of Biology, Fred Holmes (1993) 
celebrates the “simplicity, ready availability, and capacity to survive severe injury” (p. 
326) that made the frog the organism of choice for nineteenth-century physiology, while 
Bonnie Clause (1993) documents the power of standardization embodied in the Wistar 
rat. Developed from rich historical case studies, these early accounts of organismal 
choice stopped short of synthesis or generalization with regard to criteria. They did, 
however, recognize the complex interplay between different choice criteria, as well as 
illustrating diverse approaches to biological practice, including problem- or question-
based research as compared to more descriptive strategies where a problem might 
emerge down the line. 
At first glance, organismal choice using multiple criteria appear to inevitably involve 
trade-offs of a similar nature to those envisioned by Levins with regard to model choice. 
For instance, if one is interested in investigating fundamental biological processes 
shared by a broader class or taxon of organisms, an obvious candidate will be one of 
what have come to be recognized as the canonical “model organisms” (NIH, 2010). 
Relying on one of these organisms is likely to increase the generality of results, and 
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particularly their applicability to higher level or more complex organisms including 
translation to humans, and at the same time can decrease the value of the organism in 
descriptive terms (what Levins calls ‘realism’) as a representation of one specific case 
(Ankeny and Leonelli, 2011). This sort of superficial adherence to Levins’ trade-offs 
belies, we argue, a more complex set of judgements that involve what we call 
‘multidimensional refinement processes,’ that is, the identification and comparison of 
various implications of the potential choices under consideration, embracing a range of 
factors including those that are more material (such as access and tractability), 
sociopolitical concerns (such as various economies), available resourcing (including 
epistemic resources such as previous theories), and future potential. This process of 
multidimensional refinement in turn involves a wide range of criteria utilized for choosing 
organisms, and a high degree of variability in terms of how such criteria are combined in 
any one instance of research organism choice. To illustrate this, we develop a analysis 
of the criteria involved in organism choice in section 4.  
 
3. Identifying Criteria for Organismal Choice: Methodology 
A brief description of the methods used to provide the empirical grounding for our 
analysis is necessary before we delve into it, particularly since some of the criteria that 
we identify as relevant to organism choice have not yet been discussed at length within 
the historical, philosophical, or sociological scholarship on the life sciences. Some 
interpretations of what counts as "convenience" (or more generally as criteria for “good” 
organismal choice) are explicitly discussed in published research by biologists, while 
others often can only be ascertained via observations of their scientific practices or 
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presentations of their work in venues such as lab meetings or conferences, or via 
interviews or conversations with researchers about their practices (for a complementary 
account to ours on ‘good enough’ choices of animal models from a sociological 
perspective, see Lewis et al., 2013). Our starting point for this analysis was the collation 
and analysis of published biological literature that makes explicit reference to Krogh’s 
principle and/or focuses on the issue of organismal choice, including both review papers 
and original research articles, starting from a list of over 160 articles obtained from a 
citation search in Web of Science. Cataloguing and assessing the various 
interpretations of Krogh’s principle within that literature provided us with an initial outline 
of commonly utilized criteria. We were aware that many of these accounts of scientific 
methodology were retrospective reconstructions or pieces of methodological advice that 
may not reflect actual scientific practice or the range of circumstances in which these 
choices may in fact be made, but our aim was to explore the range of criteria biologists 
appeal to when clarifying or justifying their choice of organism(s). We enriched this initial 
taxonomy with other sources, including our own extensive fieldwork observing scientific 
practices or interviewing scientists;1 informal, non-peer-reviewed source materials (e.g., 
grey literature shared within communities on experimental protocols); and the extensive 
previous historical and sociological scholarship on organism choice. We do not claim 
that our search was exhaustive or that it is perfectly descriptive of biological practice. 
We started from biologists’ categories and refined them in light of our knowledge and 
 
1 When considered together, these fieldwork experiences encompassed ethnographic and 
interview-based research as well as collaborations within biology laboratories across Europe, 
the US, and Australia, carried out as part of several different projects over the last twenty years. 
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experience as a diverse group of historians and philosophers of science to create a set 
of twenty criteria.   
Our method explicitly aims to provide a philosophically useful account of criteria 
for organism choice that is both compatible with science in practice and allows us to 
develop deeper understanding of how conditions associated with research affect 
organismal choice, and in turn the outcomes of that research. The list of criteria that we 
have identified is not systematic in the sense of being grounded in a study of all existing 
scientific literature on the subject (as would be the case in a standard scientific 
systematic literature review), a task that in this case would be thankless given the 
amount of scholarship involved and the absence of any discussion of organismal choice 
in most biological publications. Instead, it provides a more expansive and empirically 
grounded list of criteria than has been proposed to date, that may usefully serve as a 
starting point for additional empirical investigations by scholars interested in organismal 
choice. 
 
4. Twenty Criteria for Organismal Choice 
Our analysis has yielded twenty criteria for organismal choice. It may well be that 
additional criteria will be found through a different type of analysis of biological literature 
and practice, or via detailed focus on certain fields (such as those that are not 
experimental which tend to be less well-represented in the biological literature on 
organismal choice), and we thus see this paper as a step towards the further study of 
these issues. The criteria have been clustered together in order to allow the broader 
categories to serve as more accessible prompts for those who wish to utilize these 
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criteria; these clusters are undoubtedly only one way amongst many to group the 
criteria and are not intended to be viewed as definitive or even necessary, but merely 
provided as a pragmatic device for the reader’s convenience. The clusters clearly are 
not rigid, as many of the criteria have features that overlap with those in other 
categories; however, we believe that providing the criteria clustered in this manner 
allows a logical flow that helps to reveal important overlaps and discontinuities.  
Table 1: Criteria for Organismal Choice 
Cluster Criteria 
(A) Access (1) Ease of Supply 
(2) Phenomenal Access 
(3) Ethical Considerations 
(B) Tractability (4) Standardization 
(5) Viability and Durability 
(6) Responsiveness 
(7) Availability of Methods and Techniques 
(8) Researcher Risks 
(C) Resourcing (9) Previous Use 
(10) Epistemic Resources 
(11) Training Requirements 
(12) Informational Resources 
(D) Economies  (13) Institutional Support 
(14) Financial Considerations 
(15) Community Support 
(16) Affective and Cultural Attributes 
(E) Promise (17) Commercial and Other Applications  
(18) Comparative Potential 
(19) Translational Potential 
(20) Novelty 
 
 
A. Access 
The criteria in this section speak to issues of accessing organisms that are thought to 
be potentially useful for research or to provide access to the phenomena of interest. We 
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include ethical considerations as a criterion which may regulate access to organisms or 
to some types of uses of particular organisms. 
A1. Ease of Supply 
Whether organisms are readily available (such as via strain centers) or rare and 
difficult to obtain can have a significant impact on organismal choice. Scarcity of 
organisms at a location or particular time of year can be limiting factors in research. For 
example in the early twentieth century, biologists studying the process of fertilization 
using amphibians had to wait for seasonal breeding periods when fertilized eggs were 
readily available. Later when it became possible to hormonally induce fertilization in the 
laboratory, temporal availability became less of a constraint (Rugh, 1968). 
Whether one is searching for specimens in nature or ordering them through a 
supplier can make a significant difference for organism availability. Organisms can be 
obtained from commercial suppliers, as in mouse research (Rader, 2004), exchange 
networks and strain centers among laboratory groups as in the Arabidopsis and C. 
elegans research communities (Leonelli, 2007; Wood and the Community of C. elegans 
Researchers, 1988), or natural or wild settings (e.g., Abzhanov et al., 2008). The 
creation of marine stations in the early twentieth century, for instance, greatly facilitated 
research on a wide of range of organisms that were only available near the sea 
(Maienschein, Matlin, and Ankeny, eds., forthcoming). Limited availability of organisms 
from wild or natural sources can make research on them highly localized and non-
transferable. If it is important to study the organisms within their natural environment, 
research can be further restrained geographically and temporally. 
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A2. Phenomenal Access  
Undoubtedly what researchers want to study (problem choice) constrains many 
of the choices that they make regarding research organisms, though not all biological 
investigations begin from a specific problem or question. There are many cases where 
researchers design their work around a specific research question concerning a 
particular phenomenon of interest, and thus look for an organism that provides access 
to that phenomenon in the sense of instantiating its typical features or providing insights 
that can be used towards understanding the phenomenon in question. For instance, 
Michel Milinkovitch and Athanasia Tzika (2007) point out that fruit flies have an “easy-to-
score morphological variation” (p. 338) that made Drosophila a particularly useful 
organism for genetics. At the same time, it is significant that the easy-to-group 
morphological variations became a selling point after Thomas Hunt Morgan’s fly lab 
identified them (Kohler, 1994) does not help explain why fruit flies were chosen in the 
first place. In another example, in the 1930s and the 1940s, Jean and Katsuma Dan 
used a variety of marine organisms to study cell cleavage. The Dans focused on these 
organisms because they provided insights into the cell division process, as the chosen 
organisms varied in the rate of division and provided uncommon visibility of phenomena 
involved in cell cleavage, such as astral rays (Dietrich, Crowe, and Ankeny, 
forthcoming). 
Organism choice may become very restricted depending on the phenomena that 
one is trying to access. In embryology, some eggs have opaque shells that make 
observing the process of cell cleavage very difficult: hence if cell cleavage is the 
phenomena that a researcher wishes to investigate, organisms with more translucent 
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embryos are a better choice. Specific questions regarding mammalian physiology may 
make choices between some organisms easy for researchers; mice provide 
phenomenal access to cancer genetics in a way that Saccharomyces may not, for 
instance. That being said, research models do not have to be isomorphic to the 
phenomenon of interest as long as effective comparisons be made (see criteria 18, 
comparative potential). Scientists working with zebrafish have pointed out, for example, 
that “the zebrafish intestine is analogous to the human intestine with segmentation of 
the small and large intestine” (Schwartz, de Jonge, and Forrest 2015, p. 370), making 
them a reasonable organism choice if one is interested in issues related to the human 
digestive system. Notably since researchers can validate the use of an organism due to 
its analogous phenomenal access, a great deal of organismal choices can include many 
of the other criteria we list here. 
A3. Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations are clearly criteria that enter into organism choice and use, 
as different organisms have different moral standing and are subject to varying levels of 
ethical and legal regulation depending on the type of research and the locale in which it 
is to occur, among other factors. The most obvious example is use of non-human 
primates which many contend would be the most appropriate experimental organisms 
for behavioral and other types of research where the intention is to apply findings 
directly to humans, but where ethical (and financial) restrictions often enter into 
decisions.  
Even more generally, humans might well be the most appropriate organisms on 
which to study human processes, but in many types of research, using human subjects 
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is thought to be ethically unjustifiable, and hence mice and rats are extremely popular 
experimental organisms for biomedical research. Other species are problematic 
because of their availability due to being vulnerable or endangered; public perceptions 
regarding use of these animals for research, and particularly their degree of sentience 
and susceptibility to psychological and physical harm; or restricted access due to import 
or quarantine regulations (see e.g. the cases of monkeys and pigs analyzed in Koch 
and Svendsen, 2015; Svendsen, 2017). Concerted efforts by funders, regulators, and 
research institutions to use the three Rs (replacement, reduction, and refinement) as the 
key framework in animal experimentation in order to ensure what occurs is humane has 
led to support of alternative types of organisms, including increasing numbers of non-
mammalian models including microorganisms and invertebrates, and even in vitro (e.g., 
cell and tissue cultures) or non-biological systems (e.g., computer simulations) where 
possible (Davies et al., 2018).  
B. Tractability 
The criteria clustered under the heading of tractability each address dimensions of 
scientific practice. Some of these criteria focus on the ability of organisms to adapt to 
research conditions, such as whether the organism survive in captivity or respond to 
experimental treatment. Other criteria are more researcher-focused, such as what kinds 
of risks an organism poses for the researcher or what kinds of techniques can the 
researcher readily apply to the organism in question. 
B4. Standardization 
In some cases, researchers require organisms whose features are stable enough 
to be reliably documented and compared across different laboratories by independent 
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researchers (Logan 2002; Hopwood 2005, 2007; Robert 2008). Complex techniques 
and methods have emerged to ensure that research organisms acquire and/or preserve 
certain characteristics across generations, giving rise to collections of standardized 
organisms as well as mutants and variants. The move towards standardizing 
organisms, most glaring in the case of model organisms, is typically accompanied by 
increasingly sophisticated standards for describing their characteristics, as exemplified 
by the recent revival of phenomics (Houle et al., 2010) and morphology as fields of 
active research interest. As a result, some organisms come to “corner the market,” in 
the sense that “so much begins to be known about a particular animal model—that is, 
they become so popular—that even more compelling potential models are no longer 
explored" (Burggren, 1999, p. 149).  
There are other cases, by contrast, where what researchers value is the absence 
of standards. The degree of natural variation within a species has a significant role to 
play in its employment within research. These are situations where biodiversity and 
variability are themselves under scrutiny, requiring researchers to look for highly 
variable organisms that can help investigate either natural or induced variability within a 
laboratory environment. Fast-evolving microbial communities are a typical example here 
as are plant variants (e.g. Love and Travisano, 2013).  
B5. Viability and Durability 
Another possible interpretation of ‘convenience’ when it comes to research 
organism choices is connected to the logistics of conducting research. Here 
considerations of viability and durability as they affect generation cycles and physical 
robustness become important. As Jessica Bolker (2009) succinctly points out, “small 
  
19 
size, rapid and robust development, and short generation time are also advantageous 
for many types of research” (p. 487). Many of the advantages that researchers have 
noted about Drosophila fall into this category. Fruit flies reproduce quickly, allowing 
researchers who were interesting in studying the transmission of traits from one 
generation to the next gather more information more quickly compared to organisms 
with seasonal generational cycles, such as maize. Similarly, high fecundity has typically 
been viewed as an advantage, as it allows for more individuals per generation. 
 However, just because an organism is small, has short generation periods, and 
highly fecund, it is not necessarily an easy choice for long-term experimental research. 
These attributes only become useful if they can be used in a laboratory setting. 
Organisms that are highly sensitive to captivity (e.g., where they have poor health 
and/or die quickly) or have problems procreating outside their natural habitat make it 
difficult for researchers to study them. For instance, John Gurdon and Nick Hopwood 
(2000) report the advantages of Xenopus to be “ease of maintenance…exceptional 
resistance to disease…a [short] life cycle…large numbers and size of eggs…and above 
all its year-round reproductive response” (p. 43). These qualities gave particular 
advantages over other amphibian species for studies of development. In comparison, 
Rana pipiens, a popular choice for researchers in the United States during the first half 
of the twentieth century, could not be bred in captivity or kept longer than a few months 
without deterioration. Later in the 1960s and 1970s, researchers using Rana had to 
contend with problems obtaining healthy specimens as wild populations experienced 
significant increases in rates of cancers. In comparison, the robustness of Xenopus 
became increasingly useful for researchers. 
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B6. Responsiveness 
When Krogh (1929) originally highlighted that a large number of problems can be 
most conveniently accessed through specific animals of choice, he was referring to 
features of selected animals that make a biological process or mechanism more 
experimentally accessible. Among all possible choices, he argued, there will typically be 
a few organisms that provide better opportunities for the experimental manipulation of 
features of interest, or for non-experimental forms of interacting with the organism to 
elicit information about phenomena of interest. As an example, Krogh highlighted that 
the lungs of tortoises are well suited for studies of the respiratory system. Because the 
trachea for each lung are highly divided compared to mammals, these organisms make 
it possible to independently measure gas exchange in the two lungs. Experiments on 
tortoises and frogs were central to Krogh’s demonstration of how gas exchange occur 
by diffusion alone, an insight that was later generalized also to mammals (Wang, 2011). 
Other historical examples occur in the case of the giant axon of the Loligo squid that 
provided empirical data for the Hodgkin-Huxley model, and the highly metabolic activity 
of pigeon breast muscle which allowed Hans Krebs to experimentally study the 
processes of oxidative metabolism (Krebs, 1975).  
Features that ease experimental access can be purely practical or instrumental, 
such as a convenient size of a particular organ or organism: Krebs (1975) notes several 
examples in which “one of the decisive advantages is the mere size of the material, so 
that manipulations can become easier” (p. 225) including giant water bugs, the giant 
unicellular alga Acetabularia, and Bufo marinus (the giant Neotropical toad). But 
experimental access often is associated with specialized adaptive features that are 
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more clearly displayed in specific organisms. In such cases, it is often stressed that 
distinct or extreme adaptations can give insight to “the limits to which organismal design 
can be driven and often best and most clearly illustrate the basic design principles at 
work” (Adriaens and Herrel, 2009, p. 1). For instance, the freshwater fish Inanga 
exhibits an extreme capacity to maintain sodium homeostasis across wide changes in 
water salinity and has been highlighted as an organism particularly well suited to study 
basic principles of ion transport and sodium regulation (Lee et al., 2016). Organisms 
with extreme morphologies or capacities are thus often chosen as the experimental 
starting point for exploring more general relations between structure, function and 
environmental demands (see also criterion 18, comparative potential). Conversely, 
organisms that are well-recognized as canonical model organisms fail the test of 
experimental accessibility with regard to certain types of experimentation; for instance 
as noted by physiologist Kevin Strange, “It is safe to say that C. elegans violates 
Krogh’s Principle when it comes to electrophysiology. Most somatic cells in C. elegans 
are quite small, and a tough, pressurized cuticle surrounding the animal limits access 
for study by patch clamp methods” (2002, p. 12). More generally, what experimental 
accessibility is taken to involve varies depending on the inquiry at hand, as 
demonstrated by the shifting status of organisms with large chromosomes (such as 
wheat or maize) depending on whether research focuses on sequencing or transposon 
activity. 
B7. Availability of Methods and Techniques 
Having a well-developed set of tools for a particular organismal system can be a 
factor in the decision to adopt that system for laboratory or field research. For instance, 
as Drosophila was developed as an organism for genetic research in the first decades 
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of the twentieth century, tools, techniques, and materials were developed that made the 
use of Drosophila easier and more consistent across researchers (Kohler, 1994). 
Simple matters, such as the size of bottles used to grow flies, the recipe for fly food, and 
the type of material used to make the bottle stopper, were routinized. Later as the 
Drosophila community grew, this technical information was communicated through the 
Drosophila Information Service, which shared technical information such as how to build 
a constant temperature growth chamber. The availability of this body of knowledge 
meant that new researchers had to invest less of their time and energy into the 
development of crucial organismal infrastructure, including development and 
maintenance of specialized mutant stocks. Similar configurations of techniques, skills 
and infrastructures characterize research on other key model organisms, such as 
Arabidopsis and C. elegans (Ankeny and Leonelli, 2011, 2012). At the same time, such 
a complex and sophisticated body of methodology, technologies, and analytic 
techniques is not always or even typically required when choosing organisms with which 
to work. Often researchers can make do with locally grown knowledge about how to 
handle an organism, as well as techniques and technologies enabling a smooth 
experimental interaction with it.  
B8. Researcher Risks  
Some research involves risk of danger and harm to researchers, organisms, 
and/or ecosystems. These risks of harm can hinder research on certain organismal 
systems. For instance, research on pathogens is crucial, but dangerous. The system of 
containment protocols and standards for disease organisms speaks to the risk to human 
researchers that can accompany some types of organismal research (Hunt, 2006). 
Research on venomous snakes likewise entails obvious risks that have to be taken into 
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account when deciding to use them as research organisms (Altimari, 2000). The risk of 
harm to the organisms themselves should constitute an ethical concern, which we 
consider under our criterion A3, ethical considerations. 
C. Resourcing 
The criteria in this section point to different kinds of intellectual resources that can 
facilitate research on a particular organism. 
C9. Previous Use 
The knowledge already available to researchers about a given organism—
including about its physiology, genetics, and behavior—often plays a crucial role in 
shaping organism choice, in what in some cases might be described as allegiance to a 
given species. The acquisition of knowledge about an organism requires significant 
effort, much of which is not directly related to the investigation of the research questions 
at hand (e.g., learning how to feed the organism or how it reacts to specific laboratory 
conditions). This expertise helps to explain why researchers who have been trained in 
using a particular organism have tendencies to continue using it (Flannery 1997, p. 
244). Increasing familiarity with an organism thus increases the entrenchment of that 
organism within a given research community, as do the use of specific techniques, 
technologies, and conceptualizations.  
A deep body of knowledge concerning a particular organism also increases the 
number of types of uses for which it can be deployed, as demonstrated by the many 
cases where advantageous features of an organism with respect to a specific research 
question only emerged in retrospect once it was already adopted as a preferred model 
(Ankeny and Leonelli, 2011). Hence applications of organisms that have been used for 
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research purposes for several decades, such as the dinoflagellate Oxyrrhis marina, 
“appear to be rising exponentially across a number of fields” (Montagnes et al., 2011, p. 
550). 
C10. Epistemic Resources 
 Organism choice occurs against the backdrop of existing intellectual traditions, 
theoretical perspectives, and/or disciplines, and thus tends to conform—at least in some 
or most respects—to the background assumptions and conceptual commitments 
championed by the scientists involved in the research (this criterion hence echoes 
Kuhnian considerations, see e.g. Kuhn 1977). The extent to which an organism fits such 
expectations, and thus the broader epistemic landscape within which the research is 
situated, is significant to the choice of organisms particularly since any rupture from 
such landscape needs to be justified and accounted for. A simple example can be found 
in the limited efforts to date to use plants to study certain kinds of phenomena: 
traditionally plants have been viewed as extremely simple and relatively inactive 
organisms that are largely stimulus-driven and have limited (if any) behaviors worthy of 
study. Thus, they have typically been thought to be poor choices for studying behavior, 
let alone cognitive activities. However, some researchers are choosing to use plants in 
novel ways by pushing back against these received views, for instance to study 
associative learning, and using positive findings to encourage others to rethink their 
assumptions about using plants for these types of research (Gagliano, 2017; Ruggles, 
forthcoming). Thus, while the criterion of epistemic resources recognizes the important 
role of theory in biological research practices, it also highlights the varied roles that 
background theories can play in organism choice. As one criterion among many, its 
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significance may shift significantly depending on the situation, and be less decisive than 
sometimes predicated within the philosophical literature on modelling (e.g. Currie and 
Levy, 2015).  
 C11. Training Requirements 
 The amount of time needed to develop expertise and research competence can 
also be a factor in the choice of an organism. Well-developed systems may require 
review of a daunting amount of material associated with developing skills. Specialized 
manuals on organisms such as C. elegans, Arabidopsis, and Drosophila (see Sullivan 
et al., 2000) offer detailed descriptions of these systems. A new or relatively immature 
organismal system where very little is known and much needs to be developed before 
the system can be reliably manipulated requires much more extensive experience and 
training. Reflecting on her choice of a non-model organism, biologist Stefania 
Castagnetti reports, “For the new species, we have to start from scratch, figuring out 
simple things like their reproductive season, how to obtain mature eggs, how to treat the 
embryos. Even to film untreated embryos we have to figure out how to mount them. So 
for each animal, we have to start all over again” (Perillo, 2017). 
C12. Informational Resources 
The adoption of an organism for research can be strongly influenced by the 
presence of databases, newsletters (Kelty, 2012), and/or journals dedicated to the study 
of a given species. Researchers often ask themselves whether there are resources that 
make information available about their organism of choice, or at least groups of people 
that they can approach to acquire more knowledge about it. The importance of 
informational resources has been increasingly recognized by funding bodies around the 
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world, which are often confronted with difficult choices around which of such resources 
to fund (and thus, which organism to support as a better for particular types of 
research). For example, “The National Institutes of Health (NIH) directly support 
database development when there is significant demand. Consider the phenomenal 
success of GenBank (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) or the significance of FlyBase 
(flybase.bio.indiana.edu) to the Drosophila community. Both of these resources are a 
testament to the influence that a well-supported database can have on promoting and 
shaping research" (Halanych and Goertzen, 2009, p. 477). Repositories that are not 
focused on particular species but do enable researchers to compare different species in 
relation to a common set of questions, are also highly valued and influential in the 
choice of organism. An example is the study of human craniofacial anomalies via non-
human animals, where “data repositories such as FaceBase 
(https://www.facebase.org/) are crucial for advancing the field. Broad screening of 
animal models (such as the mouse) can efficiently link gene identification to cellular 
function” (Liu, 2016, p. 169). 
D. Economies 
The criteria in this section speak to the financial, institutional, social, and moral or 
affective economies in which organisms may be positioned. We cluster criteria that 
range from the financial to the emotional because in part these criteria represent ways 
to consider different kinds of costs and benefits for different parties. 
D13. Institutional Support 
The institutional contexts for researchers also can play a role in their choice of 
organism. Some institutions have invested heavily in facilities for particular organisms, 
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therefore incentivizing and sometimes even requiring researchers to use those 
organisms. Historically both the Jackson Laboratory in Bar Harbor and the Wistar 
Institute in Philadelphia are good examples of the institutional commitments to mice and 
rats, respectively, that would have significantly influenced organismal choices for 
researchers (Clause, 1993; Rader, 2004). Even on a smaller scale, researchers hired 
into new institutions could also be incentivized to use established breeding colonies, 
networks, or laboratory infrastructures for a particular organism rather than using 
resources to create the infrastructure needed for a new organism. In an institution that 
may not have many resources, a researcher may choose an organism precisely 
because it does not require much institutional investment, particularly in locales where 
regulatory and compliance costs can be high, such as for the use of genetically modified 
organisms which in many countries requires the adoption of expensive and logistically 
challenging containment and security measures. 
 The priorities of even larger institutional structures also can play a role in 
organism choice. Large funding agencies may explicitly favor the use of particular 
organisms or decide to focus on projects that achieve particular goals. The former is 
best exemplified in the official U.S. National Institutes of Health designations in 1999 of 
thirteen model organisms. Whether NIH actually favored projects using these organisms 
is up for debate, but many researchers had the impression that their work was more 
likely to get funded if they used one of the listed organisms (Peirson et al., 2017). In the 
latter case, organismal choices for researchers can also be canalized when funding 
institutions set topical priorities, such as occurred in the Human Genome Project. 
Similarly, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2015 BRAIN Initiative 
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devoted tens of millions of dollars towards research to map the human brain and 
incentivized researchers to ask specific questions about phenomena. 
D14. Financial Considerations  
Given the above-mentioned specificity of material conditions, technologies, and 
conceptual tools required to do research with any one species, it is no surprise that a 
significant criterion affecting the choice of organisms relates to the associated financial 
costs. Research budgets are rarely as large as researchers would wish them to be and 
include considerable capital expenditure such as equipment and staffing for 
laboratories. Whenever choosing an organism, researchers need to consider whether 
some of these costs are heightened or diffused by available standardized organisms 
and related tools. In some cases, the presence of already developed culture facilities or 
chromosome libraries can help researchers economize; in others, the costs associated 
with standard mutants (e.g., the oncomouse), containment facilities for such mutants, or 
relevant technologies (e.g., next-generation sequencers) will outstrip the advantages of 
choosing a particular organism.  
Research costs can also vary widely from organism to organism. Mammalian 
systems, for instance, require a much more complex, expensive, and extensive physical 
infrastructure than the average fruit fly or zebrafish lab. Following NIH guidelines for rate 
setting practices, most major U.S. research universities publish schedules of animal 
husbandry per diem rates which are revealing: for instance at the University of 
Michigan, the per diem rate for a mouse is $0.44, while for a pig is $17.42.2 
 
2 Animal Husbandry Rates, University of Michigan. https://animalcare.umich.edu/business-
services/rates. Accessed on March 11, 2019. 
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Arguments around emerging model organisms provide particularly useful 
examples for analyzing arguments about the financial requirements of selecting 
organisms that do not have established track records of use in research: for instance, 
“increased resources from funding agencies will have to stretch to support the 
development of new community resources (e.g., transgenics or culture facilities) and the 
creation of preliminary tools (e.g., EST collections or bacterial artificial chromosome 
libraries) for emerging model systems, making it even more important that choices be 
made with care” (Abzhanov et al., 2008, p. 359).  
D15. Community Support 
Organism choice and use is strongly shaped by the availability of a community 
which can provide various forms of support for the research being pursued (Leonelli and 
Ankeny, 2012), particularly amongst those earlier in their careers. In addition to 
informational resources, communities provide a location for presenting research and 
recognized methods for peer review and feedback, especially through those 
communities which are primarily focused on a single organisms or group of organisms 
and convene regularized conferences, as well as steering communities, oversight 
groups, and so on which provide institutional structures that support and justify the 
research. Community support also results in stronger pooled resources becoming 
available for informal and sometimes more formal exchange, such as strains, materials, 
methods, data, findings, and techniques. The existence of a community organized 
around a particular organism also tends to lead to greater recognition more broadly in 
biology, including amongst funders (Leonelli, forthcoming). 
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D16. Affective and Cultural Attributes 
 When the American Elasmobranch Society asked its members for reasons why 
they studied sharks, one responded “Because sharks are cool!” (Ferry and Shiffman, 
2014, Appendix 2). Self-professed ‘shark huggers’ have more than an intellectual 
attachment to their organisms. Like other ‘charismatic megafauna,’ sharks are linked to 
a powerful symbolism (in this case around strength, speed, and danger) that has 
become entrenched in many cultures around the world. It also colors researchers’ 
interactions with these creatures as well as the ways in which such interactions are 
narrated both within and outside the research community, for instance in the 
widespread discourse around sharks being ‘less dangerous than people’ and the 
emphasis by conservation biologists on the falsity of some of the cultural stereotypes 
associated with the animal. They also, and relatedly, elicit an emotional connection from 
researchers. In the words of another elasmobranch biologist, ‘‘I enjoy (get personal 
happiness) from interacting with elasmobranchs more than any other taxa.’’ It is not only 
people who work with charismatic organisms that form attachments to their research 
organisms. Research communities form strong loyalties to many different types of 
organisms ranging from microbes to weeds, which may be grounded in familiarity with 
these organisms as well as the value attributed to them within the broader ecosystem. 
The intense emotional link between marine biologists and coral reefs, whose threatened 
extinction has come to symbolize the threat posed by human-made climate change on 
the planet, is a case in point (Braverman, 2016). These connections can also be a 
source of tension as attachment to organisms may lead researchers to treat them more 
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as pets than research subjects, raising not only questions of objectivity, but about the 
ethical status of research organisms (Lehman, 1992; Herzog, 2002). 
E. Promise 
This final cluster of criteria is comprised of forward-looking criteria. These criteria 
speak to the promise of potential of an organism to produce a commercial reward, to be 
compared to studies in other organisms, to be used in a medical context, or to lead to 
novel findings. 
E17. Commercial and Other Applications 
The potential to use research on organisms (or even the organisms themselves) 
as products or as part of various technologies or applications in some cases shapes 
research choices. Examples abound, such as exploring materials produced by various 
organisms as exemplars that can be used via biomimicry and other techniques to 
produce novel products like bee, ant, and wasp silk (for a review, see Liu and Jiang, 
2011). Zebrafish may well be the ‘Rosetta stone’ of biology due to its role in molecular 
biological research (Gest, 1995), but in fact it is highly valuable in economic terms 
allowing tests of the effects of effluents among other applications (Vascotto, Beckham, 
and Kelly, 1997). Similarly, there are historical examples of organisms doubling up as 
commercially viable technologies, such as the use of Xenopus in pregnancy testing in 
the 1950s. As summarized by Kurt Schwenk et al. (2009), “The vast diversity of 
functional solutions to environmental problems embodied within organismal systems 
and perfected through natural selection over evolutionary time provides a rich resource 
for human needs. New sources of food, structural materials, energy, microbial 
processes, waste and energy conversion, problem-solving algorithms, and engineering 
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design remain to be discovered, characterized, and developed. Organismal biologists 
can take a leading role in this process and in organizing and directing the data so that it 
is maximally beneficial” (pp. 9–10). A glaring example of this tendency is to be found in 
contemporary plant science, where attention to the study of commercially relevant crops 
is increasing at the expense of research on economically irrelevant plants like 
Arabidopsis or less profitable crops like Bambara groundnut. 
In addition, the potential for an organism to serve as a cornerstone of public 
engagement which in turn leads to support financial and otherwise can be critical to 
organismal choice. For instance in conservation biology, focus on ‘charismatic species’ 
goes well beyond its affective dimension but has considerable impact on the ability to 
finance research and build related endeavors such as tourism: in the case of 
elasmobranchs (skates, sharks, and rays), researchers surveyed reported that it is 
‘‘easier to engage the public and therefore educate them about conservation issues” 
(Ferry and Shiffman, 2014, Appendix 2), and similar considerations apply to work on 
coral reefs (Braverman, 2016). 
E18. Comparative Potential 
Insights into relations between structures, functions, and environmental 
constraints can be obtained by comparing organisms that are hypothesized to display 
variation across a particular dimension. The comparative method has for instance been 
central to insights in renal physiology, where the kidneys of very diverse species 
(mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) have been compared to identify 
functions of common structures such as renal tubules and Bowman’s capsule. The 
strategy has often been to observe a particular physiological structure in an 
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‘exaggerated form’ among a specific species, and to explore the generality of the 
structure or principles in a variety of other species (Dantzler, 1987). Through such 
comparisons, physiological adaptations to specific environmental challenges often 
become visible. Comparing the kidney morphology of desert rodents to aquatic 
freshwater mammals for instance reveals that these differ with respect to the length of 
the kidney structure called the loop of Henle, which upregulates urea concentration 
through osmotic gradients along the loop (Schmidt-Nielsen, 1983; Campbell and Reece, 
2005). 
The aim of the comparative method is not only to map biological diversity, but 
also to identify variations over characteristic types of solutions that respond to more 
general “constraints on being alive” (Wouters, 2007, 66). This heuristic is in line with 
August Krogh’s recommendations as he stressed that the ideal of generality in 
physiology could only be reached by studying physiological features “throughout the 
myriad of organisms” and “in all their essential modifications” (Krogh, 1929, p. 202; see 
also Jørgensen, 2001). From a comparative point of view, organism choice is thus 
guided by an interest in understanding the solutions that make possible the survival of 
organisms under different environmental conditions, but also in understanding why 
there is unity in diversity in terms of shared physiological or biochemical principles 
(Somero, 2002).  
E19. Translational Potential 
Organisms are often chosen because of the potential of translating insights from 
experimental studies to the biomedical domain. Most commonly, organisms are chosen 
because of their physiological or genetic resemblance to humans, the presence of 
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similar mechanisms in both species, or due to high rates of incidence of a given disease 
of interest. These features are often highlighted when justifying why mice and rats 
currently make up the majority of vertebrate models in animal experiments (Beery and 
Kaufer, 2015). Similarly, animals that are highly sensitive to heavy metals or endocrine 
disrupting chemicals, such as zebrafish, have been widely used to study potential 
impacts of chemical compounds on human health and environmental effects (Dai et al., 
2014); species of yeast are routinely used to model cell deregulation in oncology (Pray 
2008, Leonelli 2018).  
In some contexts, however, organisms are chosen for biomedical research 
because of the lack of sensitivity to environmental expose or due to the absence of a 
specific disease. Such organisms are often highlighted as negative models of human 
physiology, as they offer some advantages that are complementary to organisms 
chosen because of similarity (Alstrup and Wang, 2016). For instance, mice do not 
develop Alzheimer’s disease unless specific human genes are incorporated in their 
genome; thus transgenic Alzheimer’s mouse models are explored in an attempt to 
provide a controlled replication of the disease pathology and explore possible targets of 
reversal (Oddo et al., 2003; Elder, Gama Sosa, and De Gasperi, 2010). Negative 
models are also chosen in the hope that these allow for insights to possible defense 
mechanisms. The naked mole rat is an example of an increasingly popular experimental 
organisms in cancer research, because, despite its longer lifespan compared to other 
rodents, it rarely develops cancer. Studies of biochemical processes within the cells of 
the naked mole rats have suggested a set of potential “anti-cancer mechanisms” that 
potentially can be exploited in biomedical treatment (Tian et al., 2013; Rankin and 
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Frankel, 2016). Translational potential of experimental organisms can thus stem from 
similarities as well as differences to human physiology (Perlman, 2016). 
E20. Novelty 
Novelty is another potential criterion for organismal choice: in a space tightly 
occupied by ever-growing groups of biologists, particularly in association with heavily 
used, more well-established research organisms, some researchers seek novel options 
as they are viewed as providing opportunities for new findings or diverse types of 
comparisons to other species. Clearly there are trade-offs here, as although a lightly 
used or otherwise overlooked species may offer greater opportunities for discovery, it is 
likely to lack well-developed techniques and methods or a community of fellow users to 
appreciate or take up findings, particularly compared to traditional model and research 
organisms. Some have termed this the "inverse Krogh principle," namely "choosing to 
study a species that has been most appropriate for stimulating new questions rather 
than providing definitive answers” (Kram and Dawson, 1998; after Dawson and Taylor, 
1973), in this case with specific reference to the use of the red kangaroo to study 
locomotion as a way of opening up a new research space via focus on a novel 
organism. 
More poetically, others cite the medieval similes of the “world as a book” or the 
“treasure house of nature” as pointing to biodiversity as critical for insights and learning, 
for instance in a biologist recounting his own experience as "the sole PhD student 
working on hybrid poplar in a department where virtually everyone else was studying 
Arabidopsis" (Robischon, 2014, p. 195). A more general recent trend focuses on 
‘emerging model organisms,’ ranging from leeches to wallabies, which are organisms 
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that typically have been relatively underexplored except within particular research 
groups or fields, but which are being argued to be useful for particular types of studies 
(CSHL, n.d.). Finally, some emphasize ‘non-consensus’ models (e.g., Rosario-Ortiz et 
al., 2008), thus explicitly embedding an aspiration for these organismal choices to 
become more established and agreed upon more widely in the future as useful models. 
 
5. Practical Applications of Criteria for Organism Choice: Strategies in Designing 
Biological Research 
Organism choice involves complex judgements based on consideration of 
multiple criteria, a situation which may not always be explicitly discussed by scientists, 
although it is sometimes mentioned by researchers attempting to articulate their 
methodological strategies. For example, Anneliese Beery and Daniela Kaufer (2015) 
claim that “The choice of the best animal models for advancing understanding of normal 
and abnormal human functions is constrained by disciplinary traditions, expedience, 
cost, ethical and political consideration, and institutional resources” (p. 117). Having 
identified a diverse range of criteria for choosing (or rejecting), and using (or 
abandoning) research organisms, we now turn to a discussion of how these criteria are 
used in relation with each other.  
In any instance of organismal choice, not all of the criteria will be used; of those 
used, not all will be given equal weight. In fact, many research situations require 
scientists to prioritize a cluster of criteria over others. Such decisions are not merely 
grounded in claims about contingency, for instance, when a researcher disregards the 
poor viability of his or her chosen organism because it was inexpensive to use. If a 
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scientist’s goal is to increase our knowledge of some phenomenon, then phenomenal 
access and ease of supply typically will have more weight than other criteria. In some 
cases, these criteria cannot be fulfilled, and research on specific phenomena or 
organisms is not possible. For instance, before the invention of submersibles, research 
on predation among deep ocean fish was limited by the lack of access to those 
organisms. Limits on material supply made this research impossible. In an analogous 
fashion, research on predation in fish requires the availability of fish (a condition that 
can be easily met), but the fish must also engage in predatory behavior, so not every 
species of fish will suffice as an object of study. 
That said, adherence to these criteria need not be absolute. Biologists regularly 
engage in what we term ‘multidimensional refinement’ as they adjust the criteria which 
they are considering; their research goals, questions, and methods; and consider the 
wider context and circumstances of their research. Faced with the impossibility of 
studying predation in deep ocean fish, biologists could have modified the goals of their 
research to focus on a related problem, such as predation in freshwater fish where 
material is readily available and the phenomenon of predation can be discerned 
amongst the many different species that are available. This kind of refinement, we 
assert, is commonplace, even if it is seldom explicitly discussed in the methods section 
of published papers (which typically focus on the logical reconstruction of the argument 
proposed, rather than the chronological development of the research that underpins it). 
Even ethical criteria, which are seen by many as providing a hard constraint on some 
forms of contemporary research, can be subject to refinement. Widely accepted 
practices of replacement, refinement, and reduction in research involving animals 
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explicitly encourage minimizing ethically significant harms by replacing, for instance, 
vertebrate for invertebrate organisms (Davies et al. 2018). At the same time, the ethical 
principles informing this practice have changed considerably over time, and their 
practical implementation can differ across research environments. 
While Krogh appealed to a criterion of convenience for organismal choice, our list 
suggests that appeals to ‘convenience’ typically cover several distinct criteria, often with 
complex relationships to each other; how criteria are used is contingent and variable. In 
the context of making a choice from among a range of organisms, we propose that 
criteria can play a range of roles: for instance, they can constrain choice; they can 
confer an advantage or disadvantage to a particular organism or set of organisms; 
multiple criteria can act in synergy with each other to confer a greater combined 
advantage; and multiple criteria can antagonistically combine to confer a greater 
disadvantage to an organism or set of organisms. 
Criteria which act as constraints on choice limit the available set of possible 
organisms. Ethical (or financial) considerations, for instance, may be invoked to prohibit 
research on certain kinds on primates. In this context, the criterion of ethical (or 
financial) considerations acts as a constraint on the choice. 
 Some criteria may confer an advantage or disadvantage to some organisms in a 
particular situation. For a herpetologist, cobras and garter snakes may both be attractive 
research subjects, but the risk to the researcher of handling cobras and the safeguards 
that their home institution may require could confer an advantage to the garter snake. In 
these kind of cases, multiple criteria are employed in a choice between a range of 
organisms. Choice can be predicated on a single criterion or applied singly to 
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organisms. When multiple criteria are used, they can have different weights and 
researchers can use different decision procedures to maximize or minimize certain 
payoffs or costs. Because our focus here is on the criteria for choice, we leave 
discussion of different decision strategies for another paper. 
 Multiple criteria can also combine to produce a synergetic effect: their 
combination can amplify the advantage conferred beyond the sum of the individual 
criteria. Similarly, for some combinations of criteria in some circumstances, the criteria 
could interact antagonistically, producing greater disadvantages than the sum of the 
individual criteria. Possible synergies include relationships between know how, 
familiarity, and standardization; between community support and informational 
resources; or between translational potential, financial considerations, institutional 
support, and commercialization. For instance, financial considerations, institutional 
support, and commercial potential could interact synergistically to produce a greater 
incentive to use a particular organism. This feedback would be created when a 
university stands to share in the profits from the commercialization of some research 
and offers more space or financial support for that line of research. Conversely, criteria 
such as previous use and ethical considerations could act antagonistically. For instance, 
the success of zebrafish is said to be due in part to the limited ethical considerations 
associated with it, as compared to other vertebrate species. 3 
In the philosophical discussion of Levins’s criteria for model choice, trade-offs 
between criteria play a central role. The idea behind a trade-off is that criteria that are in 
a trade-off cannot both be fully realized at the same time. Possible trade-offs between 
 
3 We are grateful to Reuben Message for pointing out this example. 
  
40 
criteria for organism choice might include previous use and novelty: a very well-studied 
organism may be judged to be unlikely to yield an original new result. Unlike the trade-
offs in model choice which are grounded in logical relations between the criteria, 
however, the potential trade-offs in organismal choice are themselves contingent: there 
are not logical trade-offs that are obligatory regardless of the research context.  
We view trade-offs between criteria for organism choice as non-generalizable, 
because they depend as much on practical and situated considerations as they depend 
on conceptual considerations about how results obtained through the organism can be 
interpreted. Researchers seek to satisfy multiple criteria in any given decision. So 
ethical and financial considerations are not ‘trump cards’ that are the final arbiters about 
organism choice for scientific research. Rather, doing ethical research within a budget 
meets multiple goals: it instantiates a simultaneous solution to intersecting problems 
through the consideration and weighting of a range of factors and criteria, which are all 
heavily context dependent. Thus, the importance of determining advantages and 
synergies among criteria over trade-offs is particularly significant. While it is important to 
determine which criteria are in tension with each other in a given research situation, it is 
also productive to think about how different criteria may mutually coexist and/or 
reinforce each other.  
Virtually all the criteria listed above require that researchers identify and evaluate 
potential implications of choosing a particular organism before finalizing that choice. On 
the one hand, this process can resemble a form of risk assessment (Abt et al., 2010), 
particularly when considering possible ethical concerns or the epistemic implications of 
choosing a particular organism (such as the projectability of results to other species). 
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On the other hand, it can be thought of as akin to a feasibility study (Bowen et al., 
2009), where scientists are concerned with the possibility that research may be 
impeded by material that fails to allow phenomenal access or institutional constraints 
and are attempting to assess what type of organism may fit the available set-up. As has 
been noted in relation to risk assessment and feasibility studies, the interpretation and 
practical application of criteria for organism choice can vary significantly across contexts 
of inquiry, with different combinations of factors determining a shift in how each criterion 
is understood and implemented, a situation that explains the historical shifts in the use 
and status of certain organisms even within the same research programs and groups 
(see e.g. Kohler, 1994; Rheinberger, 1995).  
Each research situation tends to involve different types of tensions and utilize 
diverse combinations of criteria differently. In what follows, we sketch two case studies 
to illustrate the usefulness of tracking how different criteria are used in synergy or 
against each other through the development of research programs around specific 
organisms, thus exemplifying the process of multidimensional refinement which our 
approach makes visible and accessible to historical and philosophical analysis. These 
cases are necessarily oversimplified, and we hope that others will find these criteria 
useful for more detailed and complex analyses. 
 
5.1 Choosing Embryos 
Our first case exemplifies the way in which our approach facilitates the study of 
an individual’s reasoning around model choice develops over time. Like many areas of 
biology, the field of developmental biology has gone through several shifts in research 
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organism popularity. For example, in the middle of the twentieth century the frog 
species Xenopus gained in popularity whereas the use of urodeles, specifically 
salamanders and newts, declined. The latter had become particularly important to the 
field after the famous experiments of Hans Spemann’s group in the 1920s. Spemann 
and his students were especially adept at performing microsurgical manipulations of 
salamander and newt embryos, which led to a cascade of experimental work on 
induction in embryogenesis. In the 1970s, however, the frog Xenopus pushed out 
salamanders and newts as the preferred objects of study (Gurdon and Hopwood, 2000).  
Historically there are lots of reasons why this occurred. Lancelot Hogben created 
an important experimental colony of Xenopus, a frog species from South Africa, in the 
1930s and it grew in popularity because it was commonly used for pregnancy testing in 
the early and mid-twentieth century (Hopwood, 2011). However, availability of the new 
organism does not justify why it became popular for developmental biologists to use. 
The reflections of Pieter Nieuwkoop, an embryologist whose career spanned from the 
1940s through the 1980s, offers more insight into this change.  
In 1996, Pieter Nieuwkoop reflected on the advantages and disadvantages of 
salamanders as he tried to come to terms with the rise of Xenopus in developmental 
biology. Overall, he understood that good research organisms needed to fulfill several 
criteria. The “the adequate experimental animal,” he said, included “good local 
availability, easy adaptation to laboratory conditions, proper length of breeding season, 
relatively easy manipulation of eggs and embryos, adequate speed of embryonic 
development, not too long a generation time, proper histological differentiation of 
embryo and larva, etc.” (Nieuwkoop, 1996, p. 617). We see here five of the criteria 
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(ease of supply, phenomenal access, standardization, viability and durability, and 
responsiveness) coming to the fore in ways that, far from competing, reinforce each 
other. The criteria of previous use, epistemic resources, and training requirements are 
also emphasized in Nieuwkoop’s account. What’s interesting is that he realizes that the 
standards for fulling these criteria changed over time. He acknowledged that Xenopus 
offered some initial advantages, namely, it “can be reared very easily under laboratory 
conditions, while breeding can be initiated experimentally by gonadal hormone injection 
throughout the entire year.” However, “it is certainly the last fact that led to its 
preference over all other anuran species,” because there were real problems with using 
the organism for the types of research that dominated the field from the 1930s-1950s. 
Namely, if one was interested in experimental morphology, as Nieuwkoop was—
research that necessitated transplantation of embryonic tissues—then salamanders and 
newts offered real advantages over Xenopus. In this regard, Xenopus had “serious 
limitations” due to the size of their eggs and the “double-layered nature of the totipotent 
animal moiety of the Xenopus blastula/gastrula and neurula stages.” (Nieuwkoop, 1996, 
618). In other words, there was deep problems with phenomenal access for researchers 
in the mold of Spemann and many other experimental embryologists during the 1940s 
and 1950s. 
The disadvantages of Xenopus became less so as the field became more 
focused on the molecular aspects of development in the 1960s and 1970s. Once 
genetics and biochemistry became the focus of research, having physical access to the 
morphological development of the embryo became far less of a barrier. Instead, the 
year-round breeding and ease of laboratory husbandry offered significant advantages 
  
44 
over urodeles, which possessed limited periods of fertilization, creating serious temporal 
constraints on experimental work. The ease with which this limitation could be 
overcome in Xenopus was a major source of appeal for researchers who wanted to 
conduct year-round molecular studies.  
 For a researcher like Nieuwkoop who came of age doing transplantation 
experiments, the small size of Xenopus eggs and the difficulty of following processes of 
gastrulation and neurulation visually were strikes against understanding its 
morphological processes of development. But these features were not limitations for 
biochemical or genetic research. Nieuwkoop’s complaint about the rise of Xenopus is 
not that it is inappropriate for the uses to which it is put, but that its acceptance marks a 
shift in the kinds of problems undertaken in experimental embryology. His perspective 
on the adoption of Xenopus highlights a shift in what is considered to be an adequate 
conceptual fit, as well as a strong synergy between responsiveness, ease of supply, 
and phenomenal access, which however arguably limited the comparative potential of 
the research produced using the organism. In 2009, the Xenopus Community issued a 
white paper report that noted the significant levels of funding awarded to Xenopus 
research, yet noted that limitations in informatics infrastructure, genome sequencing, 
training centers, and stock centers placed Xenopus at a disadvantage compared to 
other model organisms (Xenopus Community, 2009; Dietrich, Ankeny, and Chen, 2014). 
These financial and institutional factors were perceived to be important to supporting the 
continued choice of Xenopus as a research organism. 
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5.2 Settling on a “Satellite Organism”: The Choice of Thellungiella  
As a second case, we consider the much less prominent example of using salt 
cress Thellungiella halophila (also published under a newer designation, Eutrema 
salsugineum) to research salt tolerance in plants (Inan et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2013).  
The case exemplifies the usefulness of our account towards tracking organism choice 
emerges from complex and dynamic social interactions, rather than the reasoning of an 
individual researcher. This type of situation has typically proved more difficult for 
philosophers and historians of science to analyze, and yet is by far the most common 
within the life sciences, where organism choice tends to be the concern of groups and 
even whole fields (part of what Strasser, among others, calls a “moral economy”; 
Strasser 2019).  
The choice of salt cress was certainly related to phenomenal access: given its 
ability to survive in environments characterized by extreme salinity and cold 
temperature, the plant enables researchers to study the functioning of osmolytes and 
ion channels within responses to abiotic stress, which are in turn crucial to 
understanding plant growth in dry or drought-prone areas (Inan et al., 2004). Even more 
important, however, was its comparative potential with the well-established model 
organism Arabidopsis thaliana, which is phylogenetically related and physiologically 
similar to salt cress and yet displays less tolerance to salinity, making it possible to 
exploit some of the knowledge already available about Arabidopsis to study a 
characteristic (salt tolerance) that Arabidopsis itself does not exhibit. Thellungiella was 
praised for its short life cycle, which is “very similar to that of Arabidopsis, and it shares 
important morphological and phenological attributes with Arabidopsis that are necessary 
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for rapid efficient genetic analyses” (Inan et al., 2004, p. 1720), as well as its 
responsiveness, which paralleled characteristics to which plant researchers working 
with Arabidopsis were already accustomed: “[m]ore than any other reported halophyte, 
salt cress offers simplicity and efficiency for genetic analyses. It represents an 
outstanding case of a trait-specific genetic system that also provides the needed 
powerful molecular genetic tools developed for the Arabidopsis system” (p. 1720). 
Indeed, plant researchers list Thelungiella as an ‘Arabidopsis satellite system,’ that is, a 
plant that is “phylogenetically as close to Arabidopsis as possible and therefore 
amenable to laboratory use and to the methods developed for Arabidopsis but with 
special features not found in A. thaliana” (Chang, Bowman, and Meyerowitz, 2016, p. 
332). Here we see a convergence between the criteria of comparative potential and 
training requirements, previous use, and informational resources: researchers working 
on salt cress can avail themselves of a rich trove of knowledge and resources 
associated with Arabidopsis, which are likely (though this is open to empirical scrutiny) 
to apply to Thelungiella as well. Last but not least, Thelungiella was viewed as valuable 
towards producing more drought tolerance plant varieties, which gives it an edge over 
Arabidopsis in terms of commercial and translational potential.  
These characteristics engender a high level of synergy among several criteria for 
organism choice, and are manifested through an assessment of the value of salt cress 
in relation to its role in the broader landscape of plant science and its applications. This 
was in tension with at least some interpretations of the criteria of novelty and 
institutional support. At the time at which it was chosen, Thellungiella did not have a 
reference genome, which would only be published in 2013 (Yang et al., 2013). This put 
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researchers at a disadvantage in comparison to organisms with more dedicated 
resources. Using Arabidopsis as comparator was not a straightforward way to address 
this gap, since the very validity of the comparison would need to be assumed rather 
than demonstrated at the start of the research program. Nevertheless, researchers 
decided to accept the risk, thus choosing to trust the potential link to a powerful model 
organism in order to be able to work with an economically valuable species.  
 
6. Conclusion: Unpacking ‘Good’ Organismal Choice 
As noted above, the criteria involved in choosing organisms for biological 
research outlined here are not intended to be exhaustive. What is more critical to our 
argument is the ways in which such criteria are refined in concert (or conflict) with other 
criteria and placed in synergy with others. Choosing organisms involves making 
strategic choices about which of these criteria to emphasize. Through analysis of cases, 
we have shown that such trade-offs tend to happen at the level of specific research 
instances, making it impossible to provide a generic table of the type generated by 
Levins in the case of model choice. Nevertheless, this analysis of criteria for organismal 
choice and how they relate to each other in practice does allow us to trace the 
development of research trajectories and the role of organisms within them. It also 
allows us to reflect more generally on what makes a particular organism useful, or 
perhaps to what biologists sometimes refer in shorthand as ‘good.’ At a minimum, it 
must be tractable and offer access to the phenomenon that biologists wish to study. 
From an epistemological perspective, the organism must ‘match’ the entity that it seeks 
to represent in ways that are relevant for the question(s) being addressed (whether the 
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entity is only organism’s own species, a broader group or taxon, or some other target 
group such as humans). The challenge is to determine which aspects of biology need to 
match to consider the organism under study and that which is being represented to be 
‘the same kind’ with respect to the causes, qualities, or mechanisms involved in the 
thing being studied. The less that we know about the phenomenon to begin with, the 
more difficult this choice process is (Steel, 2008).  
Articulating such requirements helps to clarify the factors on which scientists 
should focus when they choose and assess organisms for particular kinds of research. 
In addition, identifying misalignments or potential choices that prove not to be useful 
(e.g., an organism that can easily yield answers in terms of genetics is not particularly 
useful if one wishes to study a disease that turns out to have critical environmental 
causes) helps us to understand why organism-based research sometimes fails to yield 
the expected or envisioned outcomes, particularly when applying the results of basic 
research to humans for clinical purposes (von Herrath and Nepom, 2005; LaFollette and 
Shanks, 2016).  
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